On the other side of the ledger ，both China and Vietnam possessed less fully-developedlabour markets in urban areas than was common in Eastern Europe.Whereas employeesin the European socialist nations were accustomed to switching jobs in quest ofbetter opportunities（in the USSR during the 1970s and early 1980s，every yearone industrial worker in five transferred employers ），[2]both Asian countriesalike have tended to retain urban workers at a single enterprise up through retirement.With exit from a job difficult，the Asian socialist workers became quite dependentupon the good graces of their workplace superiors.Again unlike Eastern Europe，this has provided the two governments with significant indirect control over muchof the urban populace during the period of transition.Yet at the same time ，thislegacy of a permanent employer-employee bond built inflexibilities into the state-ownedindustrial sector and into the urban labour market as a whole.Within the past fewyears ，the two Asian countries have belatedly begun jettisoning this system ofjob security.The resulting layoffs and cutbacks，however，are painfully wrenchingto blue-collar families ，and social and political discontent at what they seeas an unfair betrayal of their interests could spell trouble for the two governmentsin the years ahead.

　　A final respect in which China and Vietnam have differed from some of the Centraland East European states is that the two Asian nations do not have any historicallegacy of political democracy.In this they stand in contrast to a country suchas the Czech Republic ，but closer to Russia with its Czarist past.Building uponindigenous traditions of autocracy，the first decades of the Chinese and Vietnameseparties'dictatorial rule were premised on the need for a strong state to motormodernization through revolution.The parties have been able to cast off much ofthe ideological side of this premise during the most recent decade and a half ；but in doing so they have been able to fall back upon the residual notion that theyare ？developmental ìstates that continue to require the strong hand of single-partyrule in order to push their nations forward into prosperity.The Communist governmentsin Eastern Europe in the 1980s held far less hopes of reshaping their rule in thisfashion ，in that they had to contend with the pull of the prosperous Western Europeanexample of democracy.

　　In all of these multifaceted respects ，both Asian countries were broadly similaron the eve of their reform eras ，and at variance with much of the East Europeanexperience.The implications for the ongoing period of reforms will be observedin the papers that follow.

　　Differences within the Similarities ：Comparing the Reforms

　　Notwithstanding the commonalities in the recent histories and circumstancesof the two nations and in the broad outlines of the reform programs they have nowembarked upon ，studies that focus upon comparing one country against the otherwill almost inevitably fasten upon the differences that are found.Most of the articlesin this journal issue do precisely that.This lies in the very nature of comparison，and there are strong benefits to be gained from such an approach.Delineating thedifferences enables us to comprehend in a more nuanced way，and from new perspectives，what has been happening in each of the countries，and why.

　　One initial political difference between these two Leninist states was thatVietnam's Communist Party regime was generally less ideologically strident and itssystem of rule less divisive than its Chinese counterpart.[3]Ho Chi Minh and otherVietnamese leaders did not denounce and persecute intellectuals in the same relentlessway as Mao Zedong did.There was more room in Vietnam to consider and highlightthe positive aspects of Confucianism for the country.Land reform was not as violent，and class warfare against former landlords did not drag on for as long in Vietnamas in China.Neither were rival Party leaders in Vietnam purged and jailed afterthe revolution，as occurred in China's Cultural Revolution.The greater collegialityof the national leadership in Vietnam facilitated a less antagonistic transitionto reform-oriented leaders in the 1980s than in China ，where this transition waspossible only after Mao's death in 1976and the arrests of the `ultra-leftist'faction，the Gang of Four and their supporters.This difference between the two countries'political regimes helps to explain why，when economic and political reforms beganin the late 1970s and early 1980s ，Ho Chi Minh as a symbol still remained positivein Vietnam whereas Mao Zedong's image had been tarnished，especially among intellectuals.Even officially ，Mao was judged to have been responsible for the disastrous consequencesof the Great Leap Forward and the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.Vietnam wasspared such extreme campaigns and turmoil.

　　Whereas in terms of political stability Vietnam was in better shape at the startof the reform process ，economically China was better off.China's rate of domesticsavings and its economic development were far higher.Chinese agricultural outputwas able to provide an expanding population with a subsistence livelihood whilea significant proportion of rural production was being mobilized by the state forindustrialization.Living conditions for a majority of Vietnamese villagers ，bycontrast，had fallen to low subsistence food levels；and the state had long beenunable to accumulate savings to invest much in industrialization.It would be fairto say that China adopted and authorized experiments with market reforms in orderto reinvigorate a stagnating economy，whereas Vietnam began reforms in an effortto pull the country back from the brink of a looming disaster.

　　To be sure，a considerable part of Vietnam's economic difficulties was directlyor indirectly a consequence of the country's having been at war virtually non-stopfrom 1945to 1975.An enormous amount of labour power ，capital，lives and resourceswere consumed by the wars ，leaving the country considerably poorer than it otherwisewould have been.Meanwhile，from 1953onward ，China had no major wars and wasable to invest some of its resources in social and economic infrastructure.Thefact that Vietnam wasdivided until 1975also meant that，unlike China ，the socialistplanned economic structure had never taken root in the south.Agricultural collectivization，for example ，was never fully implemented throughout the country.In fact，objectionsto the central leadership's effort to extend socialism southward helped to stimulatethe economic reforms.

　　Neither country made a wholesale，quick shift from a state planned economyto a market economy.There was no ？big bangìtransformation.[4]The process inboth has stretched over more than a decade，from about 1979into the 1990s.Thetentative ，experimental ，drawn-out nature of these transitions to a market economywas in keeping with the general orientation of policy makers and administratorsin both countries.Part of that process involved local initiatives that deviatedfrom the national economic plan and from central directives and policies，someof which were sanctioned by the central authorities ，while others were unauthorized.But ，as will be seen in this issue，even though both nations have experiencedsimilar reforms ，their sequencing has differed，with important implications.

　　The papers that follow help to identify both those aspects in which shifts arecountry-specific and those that are common to both countries as they attempt toreform their systems.But while a casual observer might jump to the conclusion thatwherever these reform programs are very similar Vietnam must be taking its leadfrom China's experience ，no author in this journal issue suggests that Vietnamhas followed consciously in China's footsteps except on minor points.William Turleyand Brantly Womack conclude from their two-city study that China's experience wasno more than？an important referent for Vietnamese policy makingì，and Anita Chanand Irene Ntrlund note that ，while both countries promulgated new labour legislationduring the same period，1992-94，they did so independently of each other.As Chinaand Vietnam navigate uncharted terrain in shifting toward a market-based economyunder Communist Party rule，they are moving in similar directions，but separately.It makes for illuminating comparisons.

　　
　　[1]Fan Gang，？Facing the Next Stages of Incremental Reform：Successes andProblems in the Case of China ì，Structural Change in Contemporary China（Monographseries no.5），（Yokohama：Yokohama University International Cultures Department，1997），p.36.

　　[2]Rudra Sil ，？The Russian `Village in the City'and the Stalinist Systemof Enterprise Management：The Origins of Worker Alienation in Soviet State Socialismì，in Xiaobo Lu and Elizabeth J.Perry（eds ），Danwei ：The Changing ChineseWorkplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective （Armonk：M.E.Sharpe ，1997），p.131.

　　[3]Others have made this observation.See Georges Boudarel ，？Influences andIdiosyncracies in the Line and Practice of the Vietnam Communist Partyì，in WilliamS.Turley （ed.），Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective（Boulder ：Westview Press，1980），pp.158-66；and Brantly Womack ，？Reform in Vietnam：Backwards Towards the Future ì，Government and Opposition，no.27（Spring 1992），p.185.

　　[4]Zuo Xiao Lei comes to a similar conclusion，though several particularsof this author's analysis are at odds with the contributors to The China Journal.Zuo Xiao Lei，？Development of an Open-Door Policy：Experiences of China and Vietnamì，Singapore Economic Review，vol.39，no.1（1994），pp.17-32.